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Introduction 
I sit gazing out my front window. Mount Wellington is the wild 
backdrop, and the tinderbox subdivision of Government Hills the 
restless middle ground. Out of sight lies the River Derwent travelling 
slowly in estuarine form, banked by suburbs and polluted by industry. 
Closer to home, across the shallow valley, houses—near matches to 
mine —box between scattered shrubs and grassy verges. In the 
foreground a roughed-up park and tended gardens fringe the little 
piece of land that I call home.  
My front garden is an attempt to explore and develop a sense of place 
here. It is a declaration, made at the age of 30, that I plan to put down 
roots. The plants are all indigenous to this area, to Risdon Vale. There 
are endemic, rare Risdon peppermints, globe trotting native hops, low 
lying saggs, yellow dogwoods (not doing very well for some reason), a 
black wattle, red and green flowering correas, a pain-to-weed-around 
prickly mimosa, and a few poas in need of a burn.  
Beyond my fledgling natives, passing through and over my garden and 
pushing up through the mulch are a myriad of other species. Dusty 
brown sparrows stuff dead grass beneath neighbour Harry’s eaves; as 
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Topsy-cat rounds the corner a blackbird sounds a yellow-beaked 
alarm; twitch travels swiftly underground popping up occasionally for 
a bit of sun. An ornamental, reminiscent of flared pants and paisley 
minis, unloads a sticky seed mass over the fence, and two scruffy shia 
tzus circle nose to bum along the footpath.  
Watching out my window I begin to ponder: What are all these other 
species? Where do they fit into my sense of place? Are they part of me 
putting down roots? If so, how? My ecological background fostered by 
an active passion for wilderness, a degree in the biological sciences 
and work in government and non-government environmental bodies 
leads me to disregard all these other species—to ignore them, to 
control them, or ideally, to kill and eliminate them. How this relates to 
nurturing a sense of place quite unexpectedly presents a quandary for 
me. When I experience this place, my place, there is no clear boundary 
between what is native and what is feral. The sparrows gather native 
grass for their nest, the blackbird’s alarm is sounded from the high 
branches of a self sown native wattle, twitch gains refuge from a 
determined weeder in the dense roots of the sagg, seeds hitch a ride on 
trouser, hair, and breeze, and in native and feral guts alike.  
Beings are interacting, interrelating everywhere any old how.  
Up until the point of buying a house and putting down roots, deep 
ecology, particularly its focus and prioritization of wilderness and the 
wilderness experience, had provided an adequate account of the world 
for me. In settling within the suburbs, however, I was starting to feel 
incomplete.  
Freya Mathews describes a similar feeling: 
The ecological ideals to which I had been committed in my work had hitherto 
seemed impossible to put into practice in the heart of the city. I had been waiting, 
for decades, for a chance to relocate myself to the country, to take up a lifestyle 
compatible with my dreams and convictions. In the meantime, I had searched 
among the innumerable urgent and compelling environmental issues that came to 
my attention daily for the one to which I could devote myself wholeheartedly; for 
a time it was rainforests, then uranium mining, then Tibet, and so on.1  
Deep ecology has long been criticized for its focus on the wild non-
human, this occasionally being interpreted as antihumanist and even 
misanthropic. But this is not what my experience of deep ecology and 
the suburbs was telling me. Rather I had a growing recognition of a gap 
to be explored, of terrain just waiting to be navigated. It struck me that 
the built environment opens up a whole new realm for deep ecological 
discourse—one that draws on the wild knowledge gleaned from 
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wilderness, yet is inclusive of the burgeoning spatial, temporal, and 
cultural locale of the city.  
This paper takes a tentative look at deep ecology’s relationship with the 
built environment through a consideration of two early works by Bill 
Devall and George Sessions.2 It reviews the growing body of 
ecophilosophical literature that looks toward the built environment and 
considers how this literature interprets deep ecology’s relationship with 
the built. I argue that failing to engage fully and openly with the built 
environment places deep ecology in a metaphysical dilemma—a sense 
of holism with a hole. Unresolved grief is offered as a means of 
understanding more deeply the nature of the deep ecology relationship 
with the built, and an avenue for exploring deep ecology within the 
built environment is proposed.  
Deep Ecology and the Built 
Warwick Fox argues that the built environment is a realm of ethical 
consideration often overlooked in philosophical discourse.3 With 
interhuman ethics focused on what goes on between humans, and 
environmental ethics focused on the natural or wild sense of the 
environment—other species, ecosystems, the “planet,” wilderness, and 
so on—the built environment hangs in a state of limbo, directly 
addressed by neither and with no voice of its own. Fox finds this 
circumstance exceedingly odd as it appears obvious that the “fate of the 
‘green bits’ of the planet is now inextricably bound up with—indeed, 
effectively at the mercy of—the future of the ‘brown bits’.”4 As he 
points out, the environment “consists not only of a self-organizing, 
natural environment but also of an intentionally organized, artificial, 
built, or constructed environment (as well as all manner of 
combinations of these two kinds of environments).”5 And, of course, it 
is the latter that most people are immersed within on a day-to-day basis.  
Deep ecology is no exception to the observation made of environmental 
ethics by Fox.6 The following tentative introduction to the relationship 
between deep ecology and the built draws on two early works by 
foundational deep ecologists Bill Devall and George Sessions: Deep 
Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered7 and Simple in Means, Rich in 
Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology.8 In both books, references to the built 
are few and far between, with the focus primarily on wilderness, the 
wilderness experience, and the ramifications thereof.  
Deep ecology without question has its roots within wilderness—be this 
the wilds of the Norwegian peaks or the diversity of the Sierra Nevada. 
Henry David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and John Muir are all cited as key 
sources of inspiration for, and evocation of, deep ecology, and all 
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turned from “civilization” to the wilds, gaining in the process a greater 
understanding of the world and the human place within it. This tradition 
continues in deep ecology with the contrast of the “civilized” and the 
“wild” providing a foil for a case for intrinsic value and for the virtues 
of wild experiencing for humans.  
Experiencing the wilderness or the wildness of a place . . . is a process of 1) 
developing a sense of place, 2) redefining the heroic person from conqueror of the 
land to the person fully experiencing the natural place, 3) cultivating the virtues of 
modesty and humility and 4) realizing how the mountains and rivers, fish and 
bears are continuing their own actualizing processes.9  
Back in the cities:  
We let ourselves become colonized by mass media, by expectations in our culture. 
We are seduced by entertainments and promises of pleasures on city streets. We 
break away only by becoming self-conscious. Thus we have a paradox, in order to 
lose our self into the larger self, we must become more self-conscious in the midst 
of techno-scientific civilization. Without cynicism or sentimentalism we create an 
opening for discovery. Outside the ordered, bordered, fenced, domesticated, 
patrolled, controlled areas of our region, our wild self is waiting.10  
There is a geographic dualism inherent within deep ecology that runs 
along the lines of the wild and the built. The ennatured place, like the 
ennatured person, lies in sharp distinction to the encultured place and 
person. On one side there is diversity, maturity, and growth, and on the 
other paucity, confinement, and stuntedness. The wilderness is where 
the former exists and may be experienced and nurtured. In the built the 
latter is found and fostered, and threatens to subsume.  
It is but a small step from this wild/built dualism to a disvaluing of the 
built landscape and its inhabitants. When arguing that “even in large 
cities, a sense of place can be recultivated”11 Devall and Sessions 
bypass engagement with the actual, the landscape of the built, and 
promote as an example a project that uncovered “information on the 
geology, native plants, animals and land forms buried under the mass of 
concrete that forms the modern image of the city.”12 In an act of 
“psychological palaeontology” the existing landscape is disregarded, 
dismissed and disvalued. All that is of true value is what lies beneath 
the concrete and the tar; the crushed and broken remnants of the wild.  
And the inhabitants of the built? Sessions draws on Spinoza’s account 
when he states: 
Most people are like the slaves in Plato’s cave; they have mostly opinion about 
casual sequences in Nature in that their perceptions and thoughts are colored by 
their ego desires. They are essentially helpless and passive, moved by emotions, 
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fears, and desires based on ignorance and imagination, and living life largely by 
reacting to external causes and situations.13  
What perhaps saves deep ecology from allegations of antihumanism or 
misanthropy is that both Devall and Sessions see the built and its 
inhabitants as redeemable. Devall asks “Is it possible to explore our 
ecological self while imprisoned in the concrete streets of a modern 
metropolis?”14 Only, he concludes, if there is radical change within the 
cities, and such radical change is possible. Devall and Sessions15 
include in their book a critique of a range of ecotopian options. These 
include ideas that specifically address the issue of cities, such as a 
perspective offered by Paul Shepard in The Tender Carnivore and the 
Sacred Game.16 Shepard envisages a world in which the entire 
population inhabits cities spread along the edges of continents and 
islands leaving the interior free for ecological and evolutionary 
processes.  
In one sense, Devall and Sessions are candid about the absence of a 
deep consideration of the built environment within their work. 
Nothing is said in this book about the export of commodities—water, plants, 
timber, etc.—to cities, nor anything about managing cities, their size or design, nor 
the political power of cities to take natural resources from far away for their own 
uses. Nor do we discuss jobs, the structure of decision-making in natural resource 
extraction and the creation of jobs for ever-growing human populations. These are 
vital issues for individuals and for public policy and deserve careful, thoughtful 
consideration based on deep ecology norms and principles. We encourage readers 
to draw from their own experiences, whether living in large cities, suburbs or the 
countryside, to make more specific decisions based on their own knowledge, 
information, and intuitions within the deep ecology framework.17 
Devall and Sessions’ deliberate focus on the wild can be seen, at least 
in part, as an attempt to give the wild the hearing it is denied within 
traditional philosophical thought. However, in light of the illustration of 
their brief yet illuminating descriptions of the built, such 
acknowledgement and call for future work may be construed as 
somewhat irrelevant. If it is the wild—be this the wild that lies beyond 
the city limits or beneath the concrete and tar—that spurs Self-
realization, and it is the built that hinders it, a clear decision for a deep 
ecologist to make is to abandon the city, seek out the wild, and return 
only to the built for wilderness promoting and preserving activism. It is 
important to note, that until recent work by Freya Mathews18 (reviewed 
below), and despite Devall and Sessions’ encouragement, deep ecology 
literature has continued to ignore and disvalue the built.  
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This raises the question of whether this relationship that deep ecology 
maintains with the built is a necessary and inherent feature of deep 
ecology. Or, is it a realm of consideration, as proposed by Devall and 
Sessions, that is just waiting for exploration? To address these 
questions, I begin by reviewing the literature that has emerged within 
the last ten years regarding environmental ethics and the built 
environment.  
The Built Blind Spot 
A growing body of literature has emerged that calls into question the 
lack of engagement with the built environment within environmental 
ethics. As Alastair Gunn points out in a 1998 paper,  
the central concerns of environmental ethics have been and largely continue to be 
heavily slanted towards animals, plants, endangered species, wilderness, and 
traditional cultures and not toward the problems of life in industrialized, urbanized 
society where most people now live.19  
Gunn goes on to make a case for the active involvement of 
environmental ethicists in environmental restoration and environmental 
justice within urban communities. Rodger J. H. King20 contends that 
there is a direct connection between the issues affecting the built 
environment and those impacting upon the wild. 
. . . if we are to contribute to articulating the outlines of an environmentally 
responsible culture, we must be prepared to address the problems faced by people 
in the places they inhabit. Degraded urban, suburban, and rural environments are 
obstacles to the development of an environmental conscience. In addition, they are 
objective constraints on our efforts to minimize waste and pollution and to enjoy a 
harmonious and integrated human existence in the natural world. Built 
environments affect how we perceive the natural world and how we understand 
ourselves. It is crucial, therefore that we consider how we might critique the 
contemporary built environment and envision one more in consonance with 
environmental aspirations. Such a task calls for philosophical attention as strongly 
as the more typical concerns with nonhuman value and the health and integrity of 
wild ecosystems.21  
For King, the built environment, where increasing numbers of people 
are spending increasing amounts of time, has metaphysical implications 
that lead to attitudes and behaviours that threaten to inhibit the 
development of a broad-based and effective environmental 
consciousness. He proposes four tentative principles to guide building 
and design within the built, and sees a “philosophical articulation of the 
built environment as a complement to the defence of the value of wild 
ecosystems and species.”22  
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In a subsequent paper, King23 builds his case, highlighting the 
relationship between the making and unmaking of space within the built 
environment. For King, place conditions awareness and feeling, and 
conditions and educates imagination.  
. . . the domesticated is our space. It is from this world that we move out into the 
wild landscape, either in fact or in imagination. Our ability to do this with respect 
and attention to details presupposes an education of our moral perception to 
overcome the habitual and acculturated anthropocentric neglect of nature.24  
More recently King,25 maintaining his focus on the built environment, 
assesses the pros and cons of green technologies, ecocentrism, and civic 
environmentalism for moving us toward an “environmental culture.” He 
concludes by stating that all three have much to contribute, but affirms 
that “ridding ourselves of our environmentally harmful habitat requires 
mindfulness about our choices and actions and, ultimately, a change in 
the belief systems themselves.”26  
Robert Kirkman27 takes this growing concern with the built 
environment into the suburbs. He gives two reasons why the suburbs 
deserve philosophical consideration. One, the suburbs are an 
environment in that they are the surrounds in which most of us conduct 
our daily lives; they are, if you like, our native habitat. And two, 
suburbs are heavily implicated in the traditional concerns of 
environmental ethics, such as habitat loss, resource depletion, climate 
change and so on. Kirkman makes an important point: 
The peculiar intertwining of technology, culture, and nature in suburbia opens up 
whole new categories of environmental problems that push at the limits of 
traditional environmental ethics. What do we do when there are conflicts not over 
endangered species or pristine woodlands, or even over overt cases of toxic 
pollution, but over various ways of using environments that are already deeply 
enculturated and thus deeply ambiguous.28 
Engagement with the built environment may be the ultimate test of the 
validity of pre-existing branches of environmental ethics. Ethical 
positions that may have seemed plausible in the wilds of “free nature,” 
if they are to stand the test of time, must also be able to account for, 
make sense of, and act decisively within the expansive realm of the 
built, including within suburbia. A line can no longer be drawn between 
the pared omnipresence of the wild, and the burgeoning pervasiveness 
of the built.  
While Gunn, King, and Kirkman take a somewhat tentative, 
introductory approach to environmental ethics in the built environment, 
preferring to suggest options and opportunities for a change in this 
relationship, Andrew Light29 constructs a detailed critique of the 
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relationship between environmental ethics and the built environment (or 
lack thereof). Within environmental ethics, Light argues, the built 
environment is a “landscape either to be mined for examples to be 
avoided or ignored all together as a product of human intentions—an 
artefact rather than part of nature and so outside of the appropriate 
boundaries of the discipline.”30 He contends that the non-
anthropocentric prejudice of environmental ethics—the focus on 
discerning, formulating, and defending the presence of values within 
wild nature independent of human agency—leads to an inability to 
engage with the built, especially when such an approach goes hand in 
hand with both nature/culture and geographical dualisms.  
In a bid to escape from the confines of the anthropocentric worldview 
and the instrumentalist approach it is seen to imply, environmental 
ethicists have headed into wild nature, for it is here that the clearest 
expressions of non-anthropocentric value are to be unearthed.  
. . . since many if not most environmental ethicists see the principle [sic] goal of 
their inquiry to involve the identification of an acultural non-anthropocentric value 
in or for nature, most theorists focus in their work on what they perceive to be 
pristine forms of natural value, such as wilderness areas, as exemplar forms of this 
value. If nature is to be considered as valuable in itself then, however the ground 
of that value is metaphysically or ontologically conceived, it will be best identified 
in those areas relatively independent of human invention as opposed to those 
humanly shaped areas which exemplify exactly those culturally bound preferences 
that many environmental ethicists wish to reject.31 
A consequence of such a position is to denigrate or ignore, not just the 
built as an environment, but also the inhabitants of the built. Light cites 
the work of Holmes Rolston III as an example. For Rolston, humans are 
not fully human if they only dwell within the built as the built does not 
include wild nature. To be complete we must actively engage with and 
respect wild nature. For Light, there exists within environmental ethics 
both the familiar nature/culture dualism and a geographical 
dichotomy—one pole, one place contains “nature” and the other, the 
built, does not.  
This leads non-anthropocentrically motivated ethicists to distinguish not 
only between the value of the wild and that of the built, but also 
between the very nature of the landscapes themselves. Culturally 
modified and built landscapes do not simply reflect a different type of 
value to that of the wild, they are disvalued. Here Light identifies what 
he terms an “undefended prejudice—a move from a critique of crass 
human-centred forms of valuation to a rejection of humanly produced 
landscapes, landscapes which cannot possibly bear any semblance of 
acultural descriptions of value.”32 Hence, anthropocentrism for many (if 
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not most) environmental ethicists does not only imply anthropocentric 
values, but anthropocentric landscapes. In taking a non-anthropocentric 
stance one is compelled to at best ignore these ‘human-centred’ 
landscapes, and at worst to deride and demean them. For Light, the 
urban blind spot is not simply an oversight by a branch of philosophy 
that has been spurred toward a rediscovery of the inherent values of 
wild nature. This blind spot presents an anti-urban bias based on 
prejudice and perhaps, dare I say it (Light does not), misanthropy.  
In way of a solution, Light suggests that we steer clear of an 
engagement with the “turgid arguments in epistemology and 
metaphysics to decide whether our intuitions about the relative 
importance of experiences in wilderness and cities are correct.”33 
Rather, he prioritizes the importance, in ecological terms, of 
environmental issues within the built, by which he refers to the 
potential for having meaningful contact with wild nature in the built, 
the environmental pluses of cities such as lower energy consumption, 
and the interlinking of sustainability of the wild with that of the 
population-dense cities. In addition, Light advocates that we consider 
the potentially destructive social implications of maintaining an anti-
urban bias, specifically, environmental ethical positions providing the 
basis for fascist and racist tendencies, albeit inadvertently. Light 
concludes: 
If environmental ethics is to fully embrace the urban, then it must describe the 
brown space of the city to be as important a locus of normative consideration as 
the green space . . . we will only have a fully environmental ethic, which covers all 
environments, when we turn our attention to the preservation of richly textured 
urban spaces as often as we do to old growth forests.34 
Deep Ecology Revisited 
While the tentative consideration of deep ecology’s relationship with 
the built offered above appears to sit well within the perspective offered 
by Light,35 what is interesting here is that deep ecology lies outside 
environmental axiology—the formulation and defence of theories of 
value regarding the nonhuman world—and it is environmental axiology 
that is now predominant within environmental ethics, including the 
works cited by Light. It is not unusual for this distinction between deep 
ecology and environmental axiology to be overlooked, especially within 
ecophilosophy.36 This oversight is in part due to the frequent use and 
apparent prioritization of terms such as intrinsic value and inherent 
value within deep ecology literature. For example, the first principle of 
the deep ecology platform formulated by Naess and Sessions states: 
“The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth 
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have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). 
These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world 
for human purposes.”37 This appears to place deep ecology well within 
the bounds of environment axiology. However, as Naess and Sessions 
stress, the use of these terms is not intended to imply a strictly 
philosophical position. Rather these terms are used non-technically—in 
a colloquial everyday sense—aimed at making the deep ecology 
position broadly understandable and widely acceptable.38 As such, the 
philosophical rigour required in value discourse does not apply to 
considerations of value within deep ecology; deep ecology simply states 
a potentially shared understanding that many people feel about the 
broader ecological world.  
Deep ecology has long argued that the fundamental problem with the 
relationship between humanity and nature is primarily ontological, 
rather than value-based. In other words, the issue that needs addressing 
is who and how we perceive ourselves to be in relationship with the 
broader ecological world. Once we have assessed, developed, and 
internalized a metaphysical position that sees us as thoroughly 
interconnected and interrelated to the rest of nature, then more caring 
and considerate norms and behaviours will flow. As Michael 
Zimmerman has asserted: “Deep ecologists claim that before knowing 
what we ought to do, we must understand who we really are.”39 This is 
a distinct approach, one that differs from that taken by the 
environmental ethicists reviewed by Light.40 Such ethicists maintain 
that the real work lies in finding value within nature separate from 
human machinations that would impel humans to behave more 
responsibly toward nature. From this perspective, metaphysics is not the 
primary determinant of human behaviour: defined, justified, and 
enculturated values are. Deep ecology argues that, without a deep 
internalized picture of our selves as intimately bound up with the 
planet, without a metaphysics that infuses our very being with a sense 
of existing as a small part of a larger ecological whole, such 
enforcement of values will always be tenuous and unreliable.  
As an environmental pragmatist, Light41 makes it very clear that he is 
not concerned with such metaphysical musings. Hence, Light’s 
explanation of the built “blind spot” does not provide an adequate 
explanation of why deep ecology has not engaged in depth with the 
built environment. It provides only a partial understanding of deep 
ecology’s relationship with the built environment.  
Freya Mathews is one thinker associated with deep ecology who has 
turned her attention toward the built. Mathews42 notes that the 
definition of environment within radical environmental thought, 
including deep ecology, excludes aspects of the physical world 
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impacted by human agency: the non-natural or artefactual, or what is 
termed here, the built environment. The emphasis of radical 
environmentalism is on the protection and preservation of the aspects of 
the world that remain largely free of human agency. Such an approach, 
Mathews maintains, rests on an inappropriate Cartesian dualism: the 
separation and oppositional juxtaposition of mind and matter where the 
human mind is the sole custodian of value, meaning, and telos, and 
matter only obtains such properties through the agency of the human 
mind. This is despite recognition within radical environmentalism of 
the inadequacy of dualisms to provide a thorough account of reality and 
the flawed and destructive nature of outcomes emanating from such 
approaches. While both deep ecology and ecofeminism strive to reject 
distinctions of a dualistic nature, Mathews argues that by failing to 
integrate consideration of the built into theory and practice, radical 
environmentalism acts to reinforce the mind/matter dichotomy and, as 
such, remains incomplete, providing an inadequate base from which to 
address the environmental crisis.  
Mathews’ critique of radical environmentalism focuses particularly on 
the perceived shortcomings of deep ecology. Despite best intentions, 
deep ecology assumes a capacity on behalf of humanity to transform 
and shape the world for the better, particularly the built environment 
and its inhabitants. It offers “a posture of opposition to the 
contemporary world, but no true praxis for it, no way of living 
harmoniously in it.”43 For Mathews, deep ecology offers insights, a 
modality of being and a platform for protection in relation to wild 
beings and places, but by upholding ecology at the expense of the built 
environment, it falls short of providing a consistent challenge to the 
“modern contempt for matter that lies at the root of the present 
environmental crisis.”44 She writes: 
Deep ecology has achieved a certain depth of inquiry, but I think a further level of 
inquiry about the relation of humankind to the rest of reality is coming into view. 
Ecophilosophy has rightly invited us to resist the machines of modernity in 
defence of “nature”, but at the same time it has left most of its followers still 
helplessly hooked up to the industries and technologies and modes of production 
of modern society in their everyday lives. There is an inconsistency here that 
undermines the ecological stance. In order to be consistent, ecophilosophy needs 
to complete or deepen the project of reanimation. It needs to take the final 
nondualist step and acknowledge an inner impulse or psychic principle, not only in 
the natural and biological order, but in the order of matter generally. Only when 
ensoulment is thus taken to its logical conclusion can we discover how to live 
attuned to soul in the world as it is, the world of cement, tar, and steel, of 
degradation and contamination, of the messes we have made.45  
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For Mathews, it is a deep cultural malaise based on blindness to the 
value, meaning, and telos inherent within all matter, not just that of the 
wild, that contributes significantly to western society’s brutish 
relationship with the world. In challenging dualistic notions of how we 
perceive matter and who we perceive ourselves to be in relation to 
matter, Mathews explores the potentialities of a panpsychic culture—a 
culture based on nondualism, which ascribes “a ‘psychist’ or 
mentalistic dimension to all of matter, or to the physical realm 
generally.”46 It is from this perspective—this love of matter—that 
Mathews reflects upon the built environment. She turns to her own 
experience of the actual and the local in her personal relationships with 
suburban Melbourne and locations throughout rural Australia. She 
explores both the “affirmation of the actual, as opposed to the abstractly 
imagined possible, and . . . an affirmation of the local, that which is 
accessible to us here and now in place.”47 What emerges through 
Mathews’ reinhabitation of the built, however, “may not always match 
our ecological aspirations.”48 She argues that her approach “offers a 
deeper response to the challenge of modernity than do philosophies that 
are purely ecological in scope.49 . . . identification with place undercuts 
the consumerist imperative of capitalism and provides foundations for a 
conserver psychology. In this sense nativist attitudes contribute to 
environmentalism even when they are focused on sites of little 
ecological significance.”50  
Two assumptions about ecology, particularly urban ecology, appear to 
premise Mathews’ position regarding the limitations of ecologism. One 
is that the built environment is in some sense aecological, or at least is 
ecologically corrupt. Mathews feels that there is a distinct determinate 
difference between the built and the natural environments.  
The greater part of the population . . . lives in large cities, or on commercial 
agricultural lands, where original ecosystems have been dramatically modified or 
simplified, if they have not been outright demolished. Our selves are not in fact 
presently constituted within complex webs of ecological relations, at least at a 
local level, and many of the biological systems on which we depend are currently 
maintained not ecologically but artificially, with human intervention rather than 
ecological checks and balances sustaining production and other vital biological 
outcomes.51 
A sense of an “original” ecology is prioritized as it is free from the 
abstractive machinations of modernity, and while the artificial 
humanized products of such machinations remain matter, their conative 
directionality only actualizes through their return to nature: through a 
“process to begin anew.”52 As Mathews’ relationship with matter is 
premised on the establishment of a delineation between abstraction and 
what she describes as nativism, albeit more fluid than delineations 
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associated with traditional Cartesian dualism, she maintains the built as 
other to the ecological.  
Secondly, Mathews accepts the broad assumption emanating from 
conservation biology that there is a hierarchy of ecological significance 
that is humanly discernible. For Mathews, ecologism can in no way 
engage with places of little ecological significance, such as the built 
environment, because there is no ecological imperative to do so. In 
other words, within the built environment with its lack of ecology and 
ecological significance, ecophilosophies that prioritize ecology, such as 
deep ecology, have no means of engaging with the actual and the 
local—with place—because these places are aecological or ecologically 
insignificant.  
However, the interconnectedness and interdependency of all things that 
is recognized within deep ecology implies that hierarchical distinctions 
in ecological value, while potentially useful on a practical level, must 
always be up for challenge. In maintaining a focus on the relational 
quality of the world, the valuing of particular types of relationships over 
others is recognized as a complex and potentially fraught exercise. For 
example, when a butterfly flaps its wings in Chile leading to the 
formation of a cyclone someplace else, there is no reason why this 
butterfly couldn’t to be an endangered species laying eggs upon an 
urban weed. Both native and exotic species are part of the 
interconnectivity of the whole and hence have agency that may be 
described as unbounded. A distinction, a boundary, cannot be drawn 
between the simplified and degraded ecology that may be found in the 
built environment and the diverse complexity of many wild ecosystems. 
The ecology of the built is still connected with and interdependent upon 
that in the wild, and the ecology of the wild remains interconnected and 
dependent upon that in the built. It is perhaps easier to perceive the 
existence of these interconnections between certain ecosystems than 
between others. The connections between the scraggly weeds in a 
polluted industrial wasteland and the wild forests of southeast Asia, for 
example, may seem tenuous. They remain, however, a part of the 
relational quality of the world, and, as such, they spur us to look beyond 
hierarchical notions of value pertaining to such relationships and 
encourage us to approach all aspects of the world with care and 
consideration. Our interconnectivity and interdependency with it all 
instils in us a humility in the face of complexity, a humility that propels 
us to question statements that contain overtones of hierarchical valuing, 
such as that by Mathews (noted above). It is in light of this focus on the 
relational quality of the world that the relevance of deep ecology to the 
actual and the local of the built becomes apparent.  
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Holism with a Hole 
Beyond the limitations of Light’s account for understanding deep 
ecology’s relationship with the built environment, and Mathews’ 
critique of ecologism, an important point emerges regarding deep 
ecology’s holistic metaphysics. Despite its holistic metaphysics, deep 
ecology has a tendency to disregard and disvalue the built, thereby 
placing itself in a quandary—an emphasis and concern for a holistic 
account of the world to the exclusion of the spatially, culturally, and 
ethically significant and burgeoning built environment. Can holism 
contain a hole? With deep ecology’s emphasis on Self-realization, is it 
possible to even begin to participate in this if the metaphysics 
underpinning this process is based on the exclusion of particular entities 
(in this case those concerned with the built environment)—a 
metaphysical blind spot? Can Self-realization fulfil its cosmological 
and ontological potentialities if what is unifying is exclusive and what 
exists is valued hierarchically? How can holism be exclusive, 
embracing one set of interrelationships and effectively severing these 
(in a psychological sense) from another set of interrelationships? Does 
holism with a hole provide an adequate account to deal with the 
complexity of ecological issues facing the world today? I would argue 
the holism with a hole seems a dubious metaphysical base from which 
to develop the “new foundations for environmentalism” claimed by 
Fox53 in the subtitle of the book covering his own take on deep 
ecology. An opportunity exists to take a fresh look at deep ecology 
within the built environment.  
A factor contributing to deep ecology’s relationship with the built, and 
one that is covered by neither Light’s analysis of environmental ethics 
nor Mathews’ critique of deep ecology, can be gleaned in the following 
statement made by Devall. He states that  
even in the concrete depths of the largest cities, a person can explore the bedrock 
upon which the city it built and trace the watersheds of streams and rivers 
channeled in concrete pipes. A person can feel the suffering of city-dominated 
watersheds and work for reconciliation.54  
In acknowledging the suffering of watersheds and our capacity to 
experience this suffering, Devall is taking a uniquely deep ecological 
position. He is pointing toward an expansive sense of self that 
encompasses the broader ecological world; a sense of self that is 
imbued with an interconnectedness of being. Such a sense of self feels 
the suffering of the world, or aspects of the world (in this case 
watersheds), as its own. A disregard of relational complexity, a 
disvaluing of the inherent worth of entities for their own sake, is 
ultimately a disregard and disvalue of self. The pain and grief 
associated with the ongoing recognition of a disregarded and disvalued 
self is, within cities where instrumentalism dominates, likely to be 
overwhelming and debilitating. To participate in Devall’s deep 
ecological practising, or Naess’s Self-realization in the built 
environment, can place one within a realm of despair and 
disempowerment. Such a realm is neither an attractive nor promising 
place to dwell. Hence, I would contend that irresolved grief, and what 
some would perceive to be irresolvable grief, has a significant role to 
play in understanding deep ecology’s relationship with the built 
environment.  
These observations also shed light on the phenomenon of 
“psychological palaeontology” canvassed earlier. The pain and grief 
experienced by deep ecologists within the built is not only a reflection 
of identification of self with the broader ecological world. It is also an 
expression of a loss of places following the rapid and ongoing 
development and re-development of the built environment. Edward 
Casey55 argues that to lose such places evokes a nostalgia—a deep 
yearning for the restoration of these places—because to lose such 
places is  
to lose one’s ‘best, truest self,’ one’s most intimate identity . . . No wonder we are 
nostalgic (literally, “pained at the [non]return home”), not just over cherished 
childhood places but over many now inaccessible or despoiled places, often in 
consequence of ecological damage or negligence.56  
In an act of place-nostalgia, deep ecologists (and it must be added, 
many others) yearn for what is beneath the concrete and the tar and call 
for its restoration. Deep ecology’s relationship with the built 
environment signifies grief for an expansive sense of self that is deeply 
rooted within place.  
When deep ecology emerged in the early 1970s and turned towards the 
wilderness, it turned its back on the built. The opportunity exists to turn 
deep ecology back toward the built, but this time we should not fall foul 
of dualistic tendencies by rejecting one environment in favour of 
another. From a deep ecological perspective, a return to the built can 
take with it lessons learnt within the wilds of Yosemite, Tvergastein, 
the Sierra Nevada, the Amazonian rainforests and Tasmania’s 
southwest. The inspiration, solace, and insights gained and spoken by 
Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, Snyder, and other great wilderness thinkers 
can come with us, equipping us for our inquiry within the built. We 
unpack this equipment—the ideas to nourish us and eloquent turns of 
phrase to sustain us—transferring it, as it were, from backpack to 
suitcase.  
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In leaving the wilderness, we travel along dusty, log-truck-compacted 
roads, through clearfell coupes, crossing wild creeks running through 
narrow forestry exclusion zones. We burst out of the forest fringe into 
agricultural land pushed by climate change into drought. Here we can 
still hear the call of the wild; we still know how wilderness and all we 
intuit there make sense here. The awareness of interconnectivity 
inspired by wilderness leads us to connect the loss of wilderness with 
the broader scale planetary crisis of change. A sense of self infused with 
a wildness of spirit drives us to question, protest, and blockade. Even as 
we approach the outskirts of the city, the sprawl of subdivision—the 
dozed piles of remnant native vegetation, the filled in creek beds—still 
make sense within the wilderness vision. Through the infinite greens of 
wild-tinted glasses, habitat and biodiversity loss, the desire for non-stop 
growth represented by housing and construction figures, and the 
assumption that the land is there alone to serve human needs, appal and 
confront us. But as we draw closer to home, the settled lands of the 
suburbs, things become less certain. Our connection to the wilderness 
becomes lost within the day-to-day primacy of the connections forged 
and galvanized by habit and habitation—forged and galvanized by 
living within place. We drive, visit the supermarket, tap away on the 
keyboard, repaint the house, sip coffee with friends, walk the dog, 
prune the roses, bait the snails and hang out the washing day after day, 
week after week, month after month, year after year, decade after 
decade. The interconnections and interdependencies that come with the 
ritualized repetition of living, of being within place, ultimately, despite 
the occasional wilderness experience, consolidate to define who and 
how we are within the world. Wilderness is reduced to boot soles 
jammed with button-grass mud, broken leaves trapped within a damp 
tent roll, digitized imaginings on LED screens, a sentimental longing 
for a rhythm other than that of the hectic workaday.  
Away from the wilderness, who are we and how are we back here in the 
city? If we manage to hang on to the threads of our wilderness 
experience, we may become activists and promoters for wilderness 
places. We may prioritize visiting the wild on every possible weekend 
and extended period of leave from work. But understanding who and 
how we are, or may be, within the context of wilderness, does not, at 
least directly, answer who and how we are within the built environment, 
especially for those of us whose connection with wilderness is made 
tenuous by physical and psychological distance. The key, I believe, lies 
in an openness and a reawakening to deep ecological metaphysics—a 
metaphysical conception that binds wilderness with human, with built, 
with valley, with cloud, with concrete, with daffodil, with 
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microorganism, with computer, and so on, in an entangling, enmeshing 
complex of ecological dexterity.  
Conclusion 
If it is grief that is holding deep ecology back from full and frank 
engagement with the built, then deep ecology’s journey into the built is 
in no way going to be an easy one. In entering the built, we will come 
face to face with our world and with our selves of the here and now—
the carnage and defilement upon which our affluence and wellbeing is 
tentatively poised. We will walk hand in hand with beings implicitly 
implicated within speciescide, and live day after day with things that 
scream to us of global catastrophe. We will butt up against the seemly 
impenetrable walls of wailing grief as places we knew and loved, know 
and love, are lost.  
But if deep ecology is to remain relevant in a time of ecological 
upheaval then this is a journey that deep ecology must take. In order to 
make some sense of the here and now and of ourselves within it, then 
we must at least hope for possibilities beyond a grief that petrifies and 
stupefies. We must begin to delve beneath the assumptions that we may 
hold about the built environment, such as how we perceive exotic 
species and technologies. It is through such openness that we may begin 
to discern yet more about the world, the wild, and ourselves. The built 
environment represents a hole within deep ecology’s holistic 
metaphysics and, as such, offers fertile ground for the ongoing process 
of Self-realization.  
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